Information related to research interest "normative ethics"
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Supervisors with this research interest
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Institute for Religion & Critical Inquiry
Stephanie Collins is a Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at the Melbourne Campus of the Australian Catholic University.
Her research focuses on social and political philosophy. In particular, she is developing theories for conceptualising our collective responsibility for large-scale structural injustices. She's particularly interested in working out how such responsibility operates within states and for-profit entities. She is happy to supervise research students working in any area of analytic and/or normative moral, social, and/or political philosophy.
Stephanie joined ACU in 2018. Prior to this, she was a Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Manchester. She was at Manchester for five years, and successfully supervised numerous Masters and PhD students there. She received her PhD in moral and political philosophy from the Australian National University in 2013.
Stephanie is the author of two books: "The Core of Care Ethics" (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) and "Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals" (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Her work has been published in many journals, across the disciplines of Philosophy, Political Science, and Business.
More information about her research -- including all of her published work -- can be found at stephaniecollins.xyz.
Stephanie encourages prospective research students -- whatever stage they are at in developing their research idea -- to email her directly at firstname.lastname@example.org.
: +61399533589 (Melbourne) : email@example.com
My published work deals with reasons, value, the relationship between reasons and value, the moral error theory, and epistemic normativity. I am currently completing a manuscript in which I give the first book-length defence of the buck-passing account of value, according to which goodness and value can be analysed in terms of normative reasons.
The focus of my current research is the meta-ethical consequences of moral disagreement. I argue that moral disagreement has important meta-ethical and ethical consequences, but these consequences are rather more nuanced than has been previously argued. I am also working on reasons fundamentalism and a formal account of wrongness.
: 3855 (Melbourne) : Richard.Rowland@acu.edu.au